Card which can be authenticated by hologram chip

ABSTRACT

A card authentication is performed. An authentication chip for performing authentication by a copy-disabled hologram chip is attached to a card and when or after the card is introduced into a handling device, the authentication chip information is read to perform authentication. Read may be performed in a planar shape but a linear shape can reduce the processing load. An arbitrary straight line or a curved line may be used as a read line shape by modifying the read position in association with the card movement when the card is placed to be read. When the card introduced to a terminal device is an unauthorized one, the card is ejected or an alarm is issued when the card is introduced inside.

CROSS-REFERENCE TO RELATED APPLICATIONS

This application is a continuation of U.S. Ser. application No.12/097,971 filed on May 26, 2009, which is a National Stage Applicationof PCT/2006/325225 filed on Dec. 19, 2006, which is based on and claimsthe benefit of priority from Japanese Patent Application Nos.2005-365416, filed on Dec. 19, 2005 and 2006-200823, filed on Jul. 24,2006, the entire contents of which are hereby incorporated by reference.

FIELD OF THE INVENTION

The present invention relates to a structure of an object such as acard, a bank note, securities, etc., which is often forged orcounterfeited and which requires authentication to check whether it isauthentic or not. The invention also relates to a method for identifyingauthenticity of such the object.

BACKGROUND ART

In the present-day society, which is often called a card-orientedsociety, a great number of different types of cards are widelypropagated. Specifically, a cash card and a credit card issued by acredit company which are relating to the assets of property owners and aprepaid card as securities, and identification cards such as a driver'slicense, a health insurance card and a passport are widely used.

In many of the cards relating to property or securities and bonds,necessary information is written on a magnetic stripe disposed on thesurface or on the rear surface of the card. By using automatic machinessuch as an ATM (automated teller machine) or a manual reading device,the magnetic information is read from the magnetic stripe, and varioustypes of processing are executed.

FIG. 1 shows an example of a flow of processing the cash card currentlyin use.

(1) When an owner of a card inserts the cash card into a card slot of aterminal device such as an ATM, a sensor at the card slot senses theinserted card, and the card is taken into the device.

(2) When the card is taken into the device, the terminal device readscard information from a magnetic recording portion of the card. In caseof a cash card, the card information such as a bank code, a bank branchcode, a type of account, an account number, etc. is read. A cardidentification number, the expiration date, a type of account and anaccount number are recorded as the card information on the magneticrecording portion of a credit card. If a personal identification numberis recorded on a cash card or a credit card, the personal identificationnumber is also read.

(3) The terminal device judges whether or not the inserted card is avalid card, which can be handled by the terminal device.

(4) If it is not confirmed that the card can be handled by the devicefrom the card information thus read, or if the information on the cardcannot be read because the card is broken or stained even though thecard is a valid card, the terminal device judges that it is an invalidcard which cannot be handled and discharges the card.

(5) When the card is a valid card and when the information on themagnetic recording portion of the card has been read correctly,communication with a host computer starts.

(6) The host computer requests the inputting of the personalidentification number.

(7) In response to the request from the host computer, the card userinputs the personal identification number.

(8) When the card user inputs the personal identification number inresponse to the request of the host computer, the host computer comparesthe inputted personal identification number with the personalidentification number which is stored in the host computer and whichcorresponds to the card information thus read.

(9) If the numbers differ, this fact is recorded on the magneticrecording portion of the card, and the inputting of the personalidentification number is requested again. In a case where the personalidentification number inputted again is proper and valid, subsequentprocedure is carried out. In a case where the inputted number differsfrom the stored number, the inputting of the personal identificationnumber is requested further again. If erroneous inputting of thepersonal identification number is repeated three times, the card isinvalidated and is, for example, taken into the terminal device as theresult of invalidation procedure.

(10) In a case where the personal identification numbers are equal, thehost computer judges that the card user is a legitimate card owner andrequests the user to input the amount to be paid.

(11) The user inputs the amount which he(she) wishes to draw.

(12) When the amount to be paid is proper, the amount is paid and thecash card is discharged from the terminal device. Then, the payment isrecorded on a bankbook, or a slip indicating the dealing is issued, andthe processing finishes.

If the personal identification number is recorded on the cash card, thedealing is carried out under the assumption that the personalidentification number is valid. Then, the personal identification numberis erased from the magnetic recording portion.

FIG. 2( a) illustrates an example of the cash card used in theprocessing flow of the currently used cash card as shown in FIG. 1. Thereference number 1 shows a cash card body made of a material such asplastics. On the surface of the card, a magnetic stripe 2 whereinformation is recorded and an arrow mark 3 to indicate the direction toinsert the cash card are disposed. Although not shown in the drawing,other necessary matters are entered thereon by embossed characters.

As information written in the magnetic stripe can be easily read byusing a device called a skimmer, the card may be forged, and oftencauses damage by using the card thus forged.

To cope with this problem, an IC card incorporating a semiconductormemory has been used. Banks and other organizations have been makingefforts to propagate this type of card to replace the magnetic card.

However, the information stored in the memory of the IC card is stillpossible to be read. If more elaborate forgery is attempted, we may notbe able to say that the IC card is absolutely safe. In addition, the ICcard is very expensive compared to the magnetic card, and it would behard to expect the rapid propagation of IC cards.

In case of the cash card used in banks, it would suffice if the card canbe used within the boundary of one country. However, in case of thecredit card, the card is necessary to be used also in foreign countries.It is practically impossible to replace all of the credit cards, i.e.magnetic cards, used in the whole world with IC cards under unifiedstandards.

Further, in cash cards and credit cards, the information such as thename of the card owner is marked by embossing, and these types ofinformation are also used for the magnetic information. In this respect,the embossed information may be used as a clue or a key in thepreparation for forging a card.

If the magnetic card or the IC card is lost or stolen, and if the cardreturned into the hand of the card owner, in particular, when the cardowner does not aware of the fact of stealing, it is liable to causedamage by the use of the forged card.

A personal identification number, consisting of 4-digit numbers, hasbeen used not for preventing cards from being illegitimately used by theprevention of the forgery but as the means to determine whether or notthe card user is proper. Since assumable numbers have been often usedfor these personal identification numbers, there have been many cases ofthe loss and damage. In recent years, the personal identification numberis stolen not only by assumption of it but also by peeping such as themeans of stealthily taking a photograph of the personal identificationnumber. It is now very difficult to prevent the illegitimate use ofcards by using the personal identification number.

For the purpose of preventing the damage caused by the forged card, someadopts the biometric technique using the pattern recognition technology.The typical examples of the biometric technique are iris recognition,fingerprints recognition, palm-prints recognition, finger veinrecognition, palm vein recognition, and hand-back vein recognition. Forthese recognition, it is necessary to register the pattern in advance.Time and procedures are required for the registration of the pattern,and also time is needed for the recognition of the pattern itself andfor determining, and that results higher costs.

In case of the contact-type recognition, the user must come into directcontact with the detection device, and there arises a problem that theuser may feel physiological repugnance or disgust. Also, in a case wherethe user has injury on the physical part necessary for the biometricalrecognition, or in the worst case, where the user has lost the physicalpart to be needed for the recognition, it is impossible to use thebiometrical recognition. Also, the recognition is partially made duringthe process of identifying, and accordingly, it is not a perfect method.

In the system using the biometrical recognition, the card user himselfor herself can only use his or her own card. When the card user has notenough time to use the card personally or does not find a cardprocessing device nearby, even if the user wants to entrust arepresentative or an agent to use the card, it is not allowed. This isvery inconvenient for the user.

As one of the means for preventing the forgery, an embossed hologram ismounted to form surface irregularities on the plastic surface in case ofcredit cards, prepaid cards, securities, etc. This embossed hologram isvery difficult to duplicate. In this respect, it is actually impossibleto forge the card provided with the embossed hologram. In the currentcondition of the use, however, it is a person, who read the embossedhologram at a glance. Thus, it is possible that the card is forged byusing the embossed hologram of similar type.

FIG. 2( b) illustrates an example of a credit card with the hologram, onwhich the card authentication is verified according to the human sense.The reference numeral 1 shows a credit card body made of a material suchas plastics. On the surface of the card, a magnetic stripe 2 whereinformation is recorded and an arrow mark 3 to indicate the direction toinsert the credit card are disposed. Although not shown in the drawing,other necessary matters are entered thereon by embossed characters.

This credit card 1 is inserted into a terminal device with a portionwith the arrow mark placed at the foremost position. Near the foremostportion on the card, an authentication verifying chip 4 consisted of,for example, an embossed hologram is mounted.

The magnetic stripe is disposed, unlike the cash card, on the rearsurface of the credit card, but the direction to insert the card intothe terminal device is the same. As a result, the direction to read themagnetic information on the credit card is reverse to that of the cashcard.

In the authentication verifying chip 4, a pattern “A”, as an example, isconfirmed by a person, who inserts the card into the terminal device,visually, i.e. by sensuous means, but is not read by the card terminaldevice.

The authentication verifying by sensuous means provides high effects inprimary screening but its reliability is low because there arevariations in the ability of each individual person who confirms andidentifies or there are also variations in the identifying environmentand psychological and/or physical conditions of the person.

The method for reading the embossed hologram pattern by machine can beroughly divided as a method for reading an image in a planar shape bymeans such as a camera; and a method for reading data in a linear shapeby the combination of light emitting elements and light detectingelements. The method for reading the image in the planar shape iseffective for verifying the authenticity, while the amount ofinformation to be processed is large and the device for this method ismore complicated.

The arrangements for reading data in the linear shape are disclosed inJapanese Patent Laid-Open Publication Nos. H06-124866, H06-318282,H07-220077, H09-319849, H11-180079, H10-143621, 2000-47557, 2000-48146and 2002-74283.

According to each of the methods described in these references, theembossed hologram is read along a straight line in longitudinaldirection of a rectangular shape card where the embossed hologram or adiffraction grating is formed. As a result, the device used isrelatively simple in structure and it is easy to use, however, is lessresistant to forgery.

In addition to the above references, Japanese Patent Laid-OpenPublication No. H11-272836 discloses an identification technique using adiffraction grating, Japanese Patent Laid-Open Publication No.2002-279480 discloses an identification technique using embossedhologram and moire, and Japanese Patent Laid-Open Publication No.2002-341733 discloses an identification technique using embossedhologram and latent image.

The arrangements for reading data in the linear shape are disclosed inJapanese Patent Laid-Open Publication Nos. H06-124866, H06-318282,H07-220077, H09-319849, H11-180079, H10-143621, 2000-47557, 2000-48146and 2002-74283.

According to each of the methods described in these references, theembossed hologram is read along a straight line in longitudinaldirection of a rectangular shape card where the embossed hologram or adiffraction grating is formed. As a result, the device used isrelatively simple in structure and it is easy to use, however, is lessresistant to forgery.

In addition to the above references, Japanese Patent Laid-OpenPublication No. H11-272836 discloses an identification technique using adiffraction grating, Japanese Patent Laid-Open Publication No.2002-279480 discloses an identification technique using embossedhologram and moire, and Japanese Patent Laid-Open Publication No.2002-341733 discloses an identification technique using embossedhologram and latent image.

When verifying the authentication by using an auxiliary tool, it iscarried out by ultra-fine lines, special lines and micro-characters byusing a screen with special shape, a magnifying device such as amagnifying glass or a special type filter generating opticalinterferences.

Practically, a light-emitting base material or a material having aspecial optical property such as a light-emitting laminated film,light-emitting ink, thermo-chromic ink, photo-chromic ink, etc., ismixed into the base material, laminated film or ink and the auxiliarytool of a special filter, a ultra-violet ray lamp, etc. is used.However, these are also low in reliability because recognition andidentification are consequently relying on the human sense.

The authentication verifying by mechanical processing is to verifyauthenticity by mechanically detecting the property of the objectmaterial. The magnetic property and the optical property may be used forthe detection.

Practically, a light-emitting material or a magnetic material is mixedinto a base material, laminated film or ink and a detection device isused. Or, specific coded information is magnetically or optically addedby using OCR characters or magnetic barcodes, and a magnetic or opticaldetection device is used.

In the authentication verifying by the mechanical processing, anartifact-metrics system using an artifact without havingreproducibility, randomly arranged in a medium, is used instead of theinformation specific to the living body. This is described in “FinancialBusiness and Artifact-Metrics” published by the Institute for Monetaryand Economic Studies, the Bank of Japan(http://www.imes.boj.or.jp/japanese/jdps/2004/044-12.pdf) and “ThePatterns of Artifact-Metrics in Financial Field”; 6th InformationSecurity Symposium(http://www.imes.boj.or.jp/japanese/kinyu/2004/kk23-2-6.pdf).

In the artifact-metrics system, a light reflecting pattern of granularsubstances, a transmission light pattern of optical fibers, a parallaximage pattern of polymer fibers, a fiber image pattern, a magneticpattern of magnetic fibers, a random-recorded magnetic pattern, a randommagnetic pattern of a magnetic stripe, a random electric charge patternof a memory cell, a resonance pattern of electrically conductive fibers,a resonance pattern of a vibrating seal, etc., which are formed bychance, are used.

As the matters subject to the illegitimate use or the forgery of thecard, “the information of the descriptions of the card” added when thecard is issued to a user and “the information of the card” given to thecard in the manufacturing process are included. (“Handbook on theTechnique to Prevent Forgery on the Surface of Affiliated IC Cards”,published by the National Printing Bureau, the Ministry of Finance (see:http://www.npb.go.jp/ja/info/ichb.pdf).

The information of the descriptions of the card is the information whichis accorded and printed on the card body when issued to the user, andwhich is relating to the card issuance such as the card ownerinformation, the period of validity, etc.

Falsification, which is a typical act of the illegitimate use of thecard, is an act to alter all or a part of the information of thedescriptions of the card, done by erasing the genuine information andadding illegitimate information.

The information of the card is the information of the card itself, otherthan the information of the descriptions of the card in the issued card.It is the information relating to the card body such as the physicalshape of the card, background patterns applied to the card inpre-printing factory, printing layer on underlying layer and protectedlaminated layer, etc.

Forgery is an illegal act carried out for the card body. It is carriedout by duplicating or imitating the design, patterns, etc., relating tothe card body to forge a card, which is similar to the authentic card inthe external appearance. Actually, the design, patterns, etc. on thesurface of the authentic card are read by the means such as a scanner,which are then, edited or amended by using the means such as a printer.

Many types of techniques to prevent the forgery of the card body areknown through combining the printing mode, types of ink, printingpatterns, etc., only in the printing art, but no decisive technique isknown yet at present.

The methods for authentication verifying to recognize and identify theforgery can be roughly classified as a method based on human sensuousability; a method using auxiliary tools; and a method by mechanicalprocessing.

In the authentication verifying by the human sensuous ability, theauthenticity of a card is identified by the sensuous ability such as thevisual sense, the tactile sense, etc. The means to identify by thevisual sense includes colors of the card itself, a watermark and anembossed hologram, which changes the color and patterns provided on thecard by changing the viewing angle. The means to identify by the tactilesense includes detecting the surface irregularities added on the cardand detecting the texture of the card body itself. Actually, a logomark, a special font, printing lines for preventing duplication, specialcolor ink, embossed hologram, an optically changing material, a latentimage pattern, etc., which are difficult to duplicate or copy and inwhich the authenticity of the card can be easily identified by thevisual sense are used. And embossing, surface irregularities,perforation, etc. are also used, on which the authenticity can beidentified by finger feeling or by the visual sense.

FIG. 3 shows a conventional example of a card, to which anauthentication verifying chip of an artifact-metrics chip using metalgranules is mounted as disclosed in Japanese Patent Laid-OpenPublication no. 10-44650. FIG. 3( a) is a general view, FIG. 3( b) is across-sectional view and FIG. 3( c) is an enlarged view of theartifact-metrics chip.

In the card 1, the artifact-metrics chip 4 in thin-plate shape made of alight transmitting resin mixed with metal granules 5 is layered on acard base member 7, having a light non-transmitting property, which hasan opening for the authentication verifying chip on it. And anon-transparent card surface plate 6 is further layered, in which amagnetic stripe 2 and an arrow mark 3 are formed thereon and anotheropening is arranged at the same position as the opening on the card basemember 7.

The metal granules 5 are mixed three-dimensionally in the transparentresin without regularity. As a result, the arrangement pattern of themetal granules 5 observed through the opening is inherent in each of theartifact-metrics chip 4. By utilizing these characteristics, a light topass through the artifact-metrics chip 4 is photographed via theopening, and the arrangement pattern of the metal granules 5 can beobserved. Therefore, it is possible to identify each individualartifact-metrics chip 4 and then, the card.

FIG. 4 shows another conventional example of a card, to which anartifact-metrics chip using fibers as disclosed in Japanese PatentLaid-Open Publication No. 2003-29636. FIG. 4( a) is a general view, FIG.4( b) is a cross-sectional view and FIG. 4( c) is an enlarged view ofthe artifact-metrics chip.

In the card, the artifact-metrics chip 8 containing a mesh member 9 andshort fibers 10 three-dimensionally mixed in a transparent resin isplaced into an opening of the card base member 1, which has anon-transparent property and a magnetic stripe 2 and an arrow mark 3 aredisposed on the surface thereof. On the artifact-metrics chip 8, aninterference pattern is generated by the pattern of the mesh member 9and the short fibers 10.

This interference pattern is inherent in each of the artifact-metricschip 8, i.e., in each card. By utilizing this characteristic, thepattern of the artifact-metrics chip 8 of the authentication verifyingchip is photographed by a transmitted light or a reflected light for thecard to be identified.

Mechanical reading of such the pattern of biometrics or artifact-metricsis generally performed by an image-pickup device and the result isidentified by a pattern recognition technique. In this respect, there isa possibility that forgery can be made according to a duplicatingtechnique.

The arrangements for reading data in the linear shape are disclosed inJapanese Patent Laid-Open Publication Nos. H06-124866, H06-318282,H07-220077, H09-319849, H11-180079, H10-143621, 2000-47557, 2000-48146and 2002-74283.

According to each of the methods described in these references, theembossed hologram is read along a straight line in longitudinaldirection of a rectangular shape card where the embossed hologram or adiffraction grating is formed. As a result, the device used isrelatively simple in structure and it is easy to use, however, is lessresistant to forgery.

In addition to the above references, Japanese Patent Laid-OpenPublication No. H11-272836 discloses an identification technique using adiffraction grating, Japanese Patent Laid-Open Publication No.2002-279480 discloses an identification technique using embossedhologram and moire, and Japanese Patent Laid-Open Publication No.2002-341733 discloses an identification technique using embossedhologram and latent image.

As described above, the technique to determine the authenticity of thecard itself is not yet firmly established, and a card, which cannot beforged, is not realized. Also, the technique to eliminate the use of aforged card is not yet realized.

[Patent Document 1] Japanese Patent Laid-Open Publication No. H10-44650

[Patent Document 2] Japanese Patent Laid-Open Publication No. 2003-29636

[Patent Document 3] Japanese Patent Laid-Open Publication No. H06-124866

[Patent Document 4] Japanese Patent Laid-Open Publication No. H06-318282

[Patent Document 5] Japanese Patent Laid-Open Publication No. H07-220077

[Patent Document 6] Japanese Patent Laid-Open Publication No. H09-319849

[Patent Document 7] Japanese Patent Laid-Open Publication No. H11-180079

[Patent Document 8] Japanese Patent Laid-Open Publication No. H11-272836

[Patent Document 9] Japanese Patent Laid-Open Publication No. H10-143621

[Patent Document 10] Japanese Patent Laid-Open Publication No.2000-47557

[Patent Document 11] Japanese Patent Laid-Open Publication No.2000-48146

[Patent Document 12] Japanese Patent Laid-Open Publication No.2000-66567

[Patent Document 13] Japanese Patent Laid-Open Publication No.2000-298880

[Patent Document 14] Japanese Patent Laid-Open Publication No.2002-74283

[Patent Document 15] Japanese Patent Laid-Open Publication No.2002-279480

[Patent Document 16] Japanese Patent Laid-Open Publication No.2002-341733

[Patent Document 17] Japanese Patent Laid-Open Publication No.2005-205897

[Non-Patent Document 1] “Financial Business and Artifact-Metrics”published by the Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies, the Bankof Japan (http://www.imes.boj.or.jp/japanese/jdps/2004/04-J-12.pdf)

[Non-Patent Document 2] “The Patterns of Artifact-Metrics in FinancialField”; 6th Information Security Symposium(http://www.imes.boj.orjp/japanese/kinyu/2004/kk23-2-6.pdf)

[Non-Patent Document 3] “Handbook on the Technique to Prevent Forgery onthe Surface of Affiliated IC Cards”, published by the National PrintingBureau, the Ministry of Finance (http://www.npb.go.jp/ja/info/ichb.pdf)

[Non-Patent Document 4] Nikkei Electronics; No. 883

DISCLOSURE OF THE INVENTION

Object of the Invention

It is an object of the present invention to provide a structure of acard for increasing security without adding basic changes to a cash cardor a credit card as practically used, and to provide a method forprocessing the card and a card processing device.

Means

To attain the above object, an authentication verifying chip formed withan embossed hologram or with a diffraction grating is non-separablyfixed on the card.

A card authentication verifying device is provided in an apparatus forprocessing the card. For detecting information of the verifying chip, inaddition to making the card in a fixed condition, scanning it byutilizing the movement of the verifying chip when the card is taken intothe apparatus is carried out.

EFFECTS OF THE INVENTION

Because the embossed hologram or the diffraction grating utilizing theoptical interference has a three-dimensional structure, it is impossibleto duplicate it unless produce a replica directly from the prototype.For this reason, even when the magnetic recording data or the data inthe IC chip may be copied as practiced in the past, it is practicallyimpossible to use a forged card.

Further, when it is attempted to illegally use the card, such the usecan be rejected and damage or loss can be prevented before it actuallyoccurs. Or, an illegitimate card may be allowed for the use to someextent, but it is easily possible to specify the user of theillegitimate card by finally ensuring to hold the illegitimate card.

The use of illegitimate card can be prevented before it is actually usedor the use of the illegitimate card can be easily detected andaccordingly, illegal use of the card can be prevented.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

FIG. 1 is a flow chart to show a flow of the processing of a currentlyused cash card;

FIG. 2 shows a cash card and a credit card of conventional type;

FIG. 3 shows an example of a conventional type card usingartifact-metrics by using metal granules;

FIG. 4 shows an example of a conventional type card usingartifact-metrics by using fibers;

FIG. 5 shows a card using an embossed hologram according to the presentinvention;

FIG. 6 shows an example of writing authentication verifying data usingan embossed hologram;

FIG. 7 shows examples of the mounting position of the authenticationverifying chip;

FIG. 8 shows an example of authentication verifying data of the presentinvention as prepared by a computer;

FIG. 9 is an example of random numbers to be used in the verifying chipaccording to the present invention;

FIG. 10 shows an arrangement example of random numbers to be used in theverifying chip according to the present invention;

FIG. 11 shows an example where the random numbers used in the verifyingchip are arranged in binary numbers according to the present invention;

FIG. 12 shows an arrangement example where the random numbers used inthe verifying chip are in binary numbers according to the presentinvention;

FIG. 13 shows an example of the additional random numbers used in theverifying chip according to the present invention;

FIG. 14 shows an example where additional random numbers used in theverifying chip are arranged in binary numbers according to the presentinvention;

FIG. 15 shows an example where additional random numbers used in theverifying chip are arranged in quaternary numbers according to thepresent invention;

FIG. 16 shows an arrangement example where the random numbers used inthe verifying chip are in quaternary numbers according to the presentinvention;

FIG. 17 shows an example where a plurality of verifying chips areobtained from one random numbers group;

FIG. 18 shows a verifying chip reading device using an image pickupdevice;

FIG. 19 shows a verifying chip reading device using reading elements ina matrix form;

FIG. 20 shows a verifying chip reading device using a mono-color readingdevice in array;

FIG. 21 shows arrangements of a device detecting the mono-color inarray;

FIG. 22 shows a verifying chip reading device using multi-color readingelements in array;

FIG. 23 shows an arrangement of a device detecting the multi-color inarray;

FIG. 24 shows a verifying chip reading device designed with a paraboloidmirror and a polygonal mirror combined;

FIG. 25 shows a verifying chip reading device using a single readingelement according to the present invention;

FIG. 26 shows a verifying chip reading device using two reading elementsaccording to the present invention;

FIG. 27 shows an example of a reading route;

FIG. 28 shows examples of a different reading route;

FIG. 29 shows a reading route of a verifying chip using binary randomnumbers;

FIG. 30 shows an example of the feature extraction on a verifying chipusing binary random numbers;

FIG. 31 shows an example of the feature extraction on a verifying chipusing quaternary random numbers;

FIG. 32 shows an example of analog processing of the verifying chipusing binary random numbers;

FIG. 33 shows an example of a mark for position alignment, a readingstart line, a reading finish line, and a mark for synchronizationsignal;

FIG. 34 shows an example of a flow of card authentication verifyingprocessing;

FIG. 35 shows another example of a flow of card authentication verifyingprocessing; and

FIG. 36 shows still another example of a flow of card authenticationverifying processing.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE REFERENCE NUMERALS

1 card

2 a magnetic stripe

3 an arrow

4, 8, 12, 15, 18, 21, 22, 32, 42, 46, 61 an authentication verifyingchip

5 granules

6, 14, 34, 44 a surface plate

7, 35 a card base member

9 a mesh member

10 fabrics pieces

16, 19, 22, 23, 25, 101, 104, 106, 107, 108 a pit

17, 20, 24, 103 a portion where the pit is not formed

48 a position alignment mark

49 a line to start the reading

50 a line to finish the reading

51, 52 a line to indicate the end portion

110 an image pickup device

111 a reading elements matrix

112, 131, 133 a reading element

113, 114 a container contains a reading elements array

115R an array of red color reading elements

115G an array of green color reading elements

115B an array of blue color reading elements

120 a reflecting mirror having a paraboloid in a semi-cylindrical shape

121 a light transmission hole

122 a polygonal mirror

125, 127 a reflecting mirror having a semi-paraboloid in asemi-cylindrical shape

130, 132 a container

134 plural lines route

135, 136 a straight line route

BEST MODE FOR CARRYING OUT THE INVENTION

Detailed description will be given below on the best aspect for carryingout the invention by referring to the accompanied drawings.

FIG. 5 shows a basic arrangement of a card, on which an embossedhologram chip is mounted. FIG. 5( a) shows a general view, FIG. 5( b) isa cross-sectional view, and each of FIGS. 5( c) to (e) shows an enlargedview of the embossed hologram chip.

A card 11 comprises a surface plate 14 with an opening being mounted ona card base member 13 having non-transparent property, and an embossedhologram chip 12 being placed into the opening. On the surface plate 14,a magnetic stripe 2 and an arrow mark 3 are disposed.

The embossed hologram chip is composed of a pit portion with depth equalto ¼ wavelength of a laser beam used and a portion where the pit is notformed. On the pit portion, a reflected laser beam is eliminated by anincident laser beam, and the reflected laser beam is not detected. Onthe portion without the pit, the reflected laser beam is detected as noteliminated by the incident laser beam.

The laser beam used is an infrared laser beam with λ (lambda)=780 nm(λ/4=195 nm) in case of a CD. In case of a DVD, red laser with λ=650 nm(λ/4=151.25 nm) is used. In case of the next generation DVD, usingblue-violet laser with λ=405 nm, ultraviolet laser with λ=351 nm or farultraviolet laser with λ=266 nm is under study. λ/4 is 101.25 nm, 87.75nm or 66.5 nm respectively.

FIG. 5( c) shows the most basic structure. Pit portions 16 with thedepth of ¼ wavelength of the laser beam used and portions 17 without apit are arranged with an adequate distance between them one another onan embossed hologram chip 15. In the example shown in this figure, eachsolid line shown by bidirectional arrows indicates that both incidentlight and reflected light are present. Each broken line shown by auni-directional arrow indicates that there is incident light but noreflected light is present.

FIG. 5( d) shows an example where the direction of the laser beam isinclined. Unless information on the tilt angle is available, it isdifficult to read the data written therein. In this example, an inclinedpit portion 19 with the depth of ¼ wavelength of the laser beam used andan inclined portion 20 without a pit are arranged with an adequatedistance between them one another on an embossed hologram chip 18.

In the example shown in this figure also, each solid line shown bybidirectional arrows indicates that both incident light and reflectedlight are present, and each broken line shown by a uni-directional arrowindicates that there is incident light but reflected light is notpresent. It is almost impossible to duplicate the embossed hologram chipof this structure. It is possible that the structure shown in FIG. 5( c)and the structure shown in FIG. 5( d) coexist.

FIG. 5( e) shows an example where laser beams with a plurality ofwavelengths are used. Unless information on all of the laser beams usedis available, it is difficult to read the written data. In this example,a pit portion 22 with the depth of ¼ wavelength of the red (R) laserbeam; a pit portion 23 with the depth of ¼ wavelength of the green (G)laser beam; a pit portion 25 with the depth of ¼ wavelength of the blue(B) laser beam; and a portion 24 without a pit are arranged with anadequate distance between them one another on an embossed hologram chip21.

In the example shown in this figure also, each solid line shown bybidirectional arrows indicates that both incident light and reflectedlight are present. Each broken line shown by a uni-directional arrowindicates that there is incident light but no reflected light ispresent. It is almost impossible further to duplicate the embossedhologram chip of this structure. It is also possible that the structureshown in FIG. 5( d) and the structure shown in FIG. 5( e) coexist.

[Embodiment 1 of the Authentication Verifying Chip]

Referring to FIG. 6, descriptions below are on authentication verifyingdata written on pits. The pits where data is to be displayed arearranged regularly to ensure the reading. In FIG. 6, one dot chain lineindicates the stationing of pits. FIG. 6( a) and FIG. 6( b) showexamples where a laser beam with a single wavelength is used and wherethe same data is recorded. FIG. 6( c) shows an example where laser beamswith multiple wavelengths (three wavelengths in this case) are used.

In FIGS. 6( a), (b) and (c), the pits where data is recorded arearranged at regular intervals. FIG. 6( a) corresponds to FIG. 5( c). Apit 101 is formed at a position where data of “101010110” of an embossedhologram chip base member 15 is recorded, and a protective layer 100 isdisposed on it.

[Embodiment 2 of the Authentication Verifying Chip]

FIG. 6( b) corresponds to FIG. 5( d). In order to record data of“101010110” of an embossed hologram chip base member 18, a pit 104having an inclined surface at a position of the data 1 is formed and aninclined surface 103 is formed at a position of the data 0, and aprotective layer 102 is formed on it. In order that the data can bedetected from a direction different from the inclined surface 103 andthe pit 104, an inclined surface and a pit with a different inclinationangle from those inclination angles may be formed.

[Embodiment 3 of the Authentication Verifying Chip]

FIG. 6( c) corresponds to FIG. 5( e). A pit 108 for information“00101010” by an infrared laser beam of 780 nm, a pit 107 forinformation “01000100” by a red laser beam of 650 nm and a pit 106 foran information of “10010001” by a blue laser beam of 405 nm are formedon an embossed hologram base member 21, and a protective layer 105 isdisposed on it.

[Embodiment 4 of the Authentication Verifying Chip]

In a verifying chip, which is to be read by a machine, there is no needthat a pattern such as characters, design, etc. recognizable by a personis written. FIG. 8 shows a pit arrangement example of the verifyingchip, prepared by using binary data by a compute, suitable formechanical reading.

In this verifying embossed hologram chip, 1024 binary data are arrangedin a matrix form of 32×32, consisting of an embossed hologram. In thisfigure, the position where binary data “0” is written is shown in blank,and the position where the binary data “1” is written is shown with amark “*”.

Now, a method to obtain the binary data is described. FIG. 9 shows anexample of true random numbers with hexadecimal numbers of 256 digits,which are obtained by detecting a radiation ray irradiated as the resultof nuclear fission of radioactive substance. Random numbers used for acrypt key or the like are generally supplied as hexadecimal numbers assuch.

FIG. 10 shows hexadecimal random numbers shown in FIG. 9 arranged in thematrix form of 8 columns×32 rows. The hexadecimal numbers can beexpressed by replacing with binary 4-digit numbers.

That is, “0” of the hexadecimal number corresponds to “0000” of binarynumbers. Similarly, “1” corresponds to “0001”, “2” corresponds to“0010”, “3” corresponds to “0011”, “4” corresponds to “0100”, “5”corresponds to “0101”, “6” corresponds to “0110”, “7” corresponds to“0111”, “8” corresponds to “1000” and “9” corresponds to “1001”. “A”corresponds to “1010”, “B” corresponds to “1011”, “C” corresponds to“1100”, “D” corresponds to “1101”, “E” corresponds to “1110” and “F”corresponds to “1111”.

Based on the expressions as given above, 256-digit hexadecimal randomnumbers shown in FIG. 9 are substituted by binary random numbers asshown in FIG. 11. One digit of the hexadecimal number can be replaced by4-digit binary numbers. Thus, 256-digit hexadecimal numbers correspondto 256 digits×4 digits=1024 digits in binary numbers. These binarynumbers can be obtained directly in a random number generator, and insuch a case, it is not necessary to perform substitution operation.

These numbers are arranged in the matrix of 8 columns×32 rows as shownin FIG. 10. Further, for each digit of binary numbers, matrix of 32columns×32 rows are arranged as shown in FIG. 12.

Finally, the position corresponding to “0” of the binary number in thematrix of FIG. 12 is left without writing the data. Data is written tothe position with the mark “*” to correspond to “1”. The arrangement ofthe verifying chip as shown in FIG. 8 is thus, obtained.

The authentication verifying chip prepared in this way has 32 column×32rows×1 bit=1024 bits for authentication verifying, that is, it has anauthentication verifying key of 1024 bits.

For the embossed hologram chip shown in FIG. 6( c), the lights with aplurality of wavelengths can be used. Next, an example of the pitarrangement of a verifying chip of a card, which is prepared by computersuitable for mechanical reading of binary data, and which uses thelights of generally called red (R), green (G) and blue (B) is described.

These “R”, “G” and “B” can express a total of four conditions including“0” where no data is written. In other words, these can be handled asquaternary numbers. The quaternary numbers can be expressed by four2-bit numbers, i.e., “00”, “01”, “10”, and “11”.

FIG. 13 shows hexadecimal random numbers of 256 digits shown in FIG. 9and further hexadecimal random numbers of 256 digits which antecedethose. Here, what is shown as “hexadecimal random numbers group a” isthe same random numbers as shown in FIG. 9, and “hexadecimal randomnumbers group b” is the random numbers, which antecedes “hexadecimalrandom numbers group a”.

These hexadecimal random numbers group is converted to a binary randomnumbers group. FIG. 14 shows the random numbers divided for every 2 bitsin order to convert to the quaternary numbers expressed as “0”, “R”, “G”and “B”.

Further, binary number “00” is converted to quaternary number “0”,binary number “01” to quaternary number “R”, binary number “10” toquaternary number “G” and binary number “11” to quaternary number “B” asshown in FIG. 15.

The quaternary numbers thus obtained are arranged in the matrix of 32columns×32 rows, similarly to the binary numbers shown in FIG. 8 or FIG.12, and these are shown in FIG. 16. The verifying chip thus prepared hasthe data of 32 columns×32 rows×2 bits=2048 bits for authenticationverifying, in other words, it has an authentication verifying key of2048 bits.

[Embodiment 5 of the Authentication Verifying Chip]

Now, referring to FIG. 17, a method to obtain a plurality of verifyingchips from one random numbers group is described. FIG. 17( a), FIG. 17(b), FIG. 17( c) and FIG. 17( d) each shows a matrix pattern of 16×16based on the matrix pattern of 32×32 in FIG. 8. FIG. 17( a) has theorigin at the coordinates (0,0), FIG. 17( b) has the origin at thecoordinates (1,0), FIG. 17( c) has the origin at the coordinates (0,1)and FIG. 17( d) has the origin at the coordinates (1,1). In this way, itis possible to have a plurality of matrix patterns from one matrixpattern obtained from the random numbers group shown in FIG. 6.

For the purpose of obtaining a plurality of matrix patterns from onerandom numbers group, it is also possible to use various methods such asa method to change the use position to start the random numbers groupshown in FIG. 6 or a method to change the preparation position to startthe matrix pattern shown in FIG. 7.

In so doing, a card issuer can maintain secrecy by arranging one randomnumbers group as a master random numbers group and can obtain aplurality of matrix patterns based on the master random numbers group.It is also possible to automatically control the plurality of matrixpatterns based on the information of the origin.

In the examples shown in FIG. 8, FIG. 12 and FIG. 17, the authenticationverifying data is recorded by binary numbers expressed in 1 bit, and inthe example shown in FIG. 16, the authentication verifying data isrecorded by quaternary numbers expressed in 2 bits. In addition tothese, it is also possible to use octal numbers expressed in 3 bits andhexadecimal numbers expressed in 4 bits.

[Mounting Position of the Authentication Verifying Chip]

FIG. 7 shows examples of the mounting positions of the verifying chipaccording to the structural features as described above. The verifyingchip 46 can be mounted, other than the position at about the centralportion of the card body as shown in FIG. 5, at the following positions:at the foremost position in the middle portion as shown in FIG. 7( a);at the central position in the middle portion as shown in FIG. 7( b); atthe posterior position in the middle portion as shown in FIG. 7( c); atthe foremost position in the lower portion as shown in FIG. 7( d); atthe central position in the lower portion as shown in FIG. 7( e); and atthe posterior position in the lower portion as shown in FIG. 7( f).While it can also be mounted at a position in the upper portion, it isdesirable for the mounting position to avoid the position in the upperportion, when there may be influence on the reading of the informationfrom the magnetic stripe.

[Embodiment 1 of the Reading Device]

Descriptions below are on the reading of a verifying chip, which is anembossed hologram chip. A method to read the embossed hologram chipsimply as a plane, a method to read a plane as an assembly of lines anda method to read a plane as an assembly of dots are known.

FIG. 18 shows an example using an image pickup device of the most basicarrangement in the method to read the embossed hologram chip simply as aplane. From a card body 11, which consists of a card base plate 13, acard surface plate 14 and an embossed hologram chip 15, the embossedhologram chip 15 is read by an image pickup device 110, and the resultis verified by the pattern recognition technique.

When the card 11 is taken into a reading apparatus and is stopped, theimage pickup device 110 photographs the embossed hologram chip 15, whichis irradiated by a laser beam source (not shown). By the image thusphotographed, the embossed hologram chip 15 is authenticated, andaccordingly, the authenticity of the card 11 is verified.

[Embodiment 2 of the Reading Device]

Referring to FIG. 19, description will be given below on an arrangementexample of a reading device, which comprises detection elements in theform of matrix and which performs reading in the planar shape. FIG. 19(a) shows a general arrangement of a reading device and FIG. 19( b) showsthe corresponding relation between the card and the reading device. InFIG. 19, the reference numeral 11 shows a card body; 13 a base plate; 14a surface plate; and 15 a verifying chip, which is an embossed hologramchip. The reference numeral 111 shows a reading elements matrix wheresmall size reading elements 112 are arranged in the planar shape so asto cover up the verifying chip 15. Each of the reading elements has alight source comprising a semiconductor laser or the like and a lightdetecting element comprising a photodiode or the like.

When the card 11 is taken into a reading apparatus and is stopped, theverifying chip 15 is positioned under the reading elements matrix 111 inplanar shape. Then, the reading elements matrix 111 reads authenticationverifying data of the verifying chip 15. [Embodiment 3 of the ReadingDevice]

Description will be given below on a device for reading the plane of theverifying chip as an assembly of lines.

FIG. 20 shows an example where the reading elements are arranged inarray. FIG. 20( a) shows a general arrangement of a detecting unit of areading device and FIG. 20( b) shows the corresponding relation betweenthe card and the reading elements in array. The card 11 is the same asthe card shown in FIG. 19, and the detailed description on the card isnot given here.

In FIG. 20, the reference numeral 113 shows a container with a length,which is slightly longer than the width in moving direction of theverifying chip 15. A plurality of reading elements array 112 are placedin a linear arrangement within the container and make up together areading elements array. Each of the reading elements has a light sourcecomprising a semiconductor laser and the like and a light detectingelement comprising a photodiode or the like.

When the card 11 is taken into a card reading apparatus, it passes underthe reading elements array. At this moment, the reading elements array112 reads authentication verifying data of the verifying chip 15.

FIG. 21 shows examples of arrays of the reading elements in the readingdevice as shown in FIG. 20. As shown in FIG. 21( a), 32 reading elementsare placed from “DOO” to “D31” in a single column on a base. These maybe placed from “DOO” to “D31” in a zigzag arrangement as shown in FIG.21( b).

[Embodiment 4 of the Reading Device]

FIG. 22 shows an arrangement example of a device for the cardauthentication verifying when a plurality of different colors are used,which are quaternary numbers as shown in FIG. 16. In this example,according to the reading elements array shown in FIG. 20, a container114 contains an array of red light reading elements 115R, an array ofgreen light reading elements 115G, and an array of blue light readingelements 115B.

The red light reading elements array 115R, the green light readingelements array 115G and the blue light reading elements array 115B aregiven here simply as examples, and it is needless to say that anycombination of color lights may be used.

FIG. 23 shows an arrangement example of arrays of reading elements whena laser beam R, a laser beam G and a laser beam B as shown in FIG. 22are used. In this example, an array of the laser beam R reading elements“ROO” to “R31”, an array of the laser beam G reading elements “GOO” to“G31”, and an array of the laser beam B reading elements “BOO” to “B31”,having 32 reading elements each are arranged in three columns.

[Embodiment 5 of the Reading Device]

In the efforts to develop the next generation DVD, it has been understudy that laser beams of a laser for CD, a laser for DVD and a laserfor the next generation DVD can be detected by an optical detectorapplicable to three wavelengths by using an optical head using theoptical system to be integrated or by using a 3-wavelength laser whichcan emit three laser beams by a single element. (See Nikkei Electronics,No. 883, p.119, Sep. 27, 2004). When the optical detectors are alignedin one row and are used, it is possible to have an arrangement of thereading elements array for the laser beam R, the laser beam G and thelaser beam B, similar to the arrangement shown in FIG. 20.

[Embodiment 6 of the Reading Device]

FIG. 24 shows a reading device with the new arrangement. Opticalscanning means to use the reflection of the laser beam by a rotatingpolygonal pillar mirror is adopted in the device such as a laser beamprinter. In this scanning means, optical scanning can be performed onlyby the rotating movement of the polygonal pillar mirror. Because thereflection light beam obtained is reflected in radial direction, thelight beam does not enter perpendicularly to an object. In this sense,the optical scanning by the polygonal pillar mirror is not the optimalmeans to be used as the detecting means for an embossed hologram chip byreading the information according to the depth of pits and to thewavelength of the incident light.

As the means to obtain parallel beams, paraboloid is used in areflecting telescope or a parabola antenna. FIG. 24( a) shows therelation between a paraboloid and parallel beams. In this figure,reference symbol X represents X-axis and the symbol Y represents Y-axiswhich is orthogonal to X-axis and the symbol O represents the origin.The symbol P represents a parabola, which is expressed as Y=−X². Thisparabola has a focal point F at the position of X=0 and Y=−¼. Allstraight lines running in parallel to Y-axis are concentrated to thefocal point F when reflected by the parabola P. In other words, anystraight line starting from the focal point F runs in parallel to Y-axiswhen reflected by the parabola P.

A basic arrangement of a device for reading an embossed hologram byapplying this principle is shown in FIG. 24( b). In this figure, thereference numeral 120 represents a reflecting mirror having a paraboliccylindrical surface. It is designed in semi-cylindrical shape with itslength running in a direction perpendicularly crossing the drawingsurface. Also, a light transmission hole 121 where light can passthrough is formed at a position which corresponds to the origin in FIG.24( a). Further, at the focal point of the reflecting parabolic cylindermirror 120, a polygonal mirror 122 is disposed, which has a rotationaxis in parallel to extending axis of the reflecting parabolic cylindermirror 120 and has a polygonal reflecting surface. The reference numeral124 represents an embossed hologram chip.

A laser beam emitted from a light emitting/detecting element 123 indirection of Y-axis as shown in FIG. 24( a) passes through the lighttransmission hole 121 and incidents on the polygonal mirror 122. Thelaser beam, thus incidented on the polygonal mirror, is reflected andincidents on the reflecting parabolic cylinder mirror 120. Then, it isreflected and incidents on the embossed hologram chip 124.

As the polygonal mirror 122 is disposed at the focal point of thereflecting parabolic cylinder mirror 120, the laser beam, which isreflected by the polygonal mirror 122 and incidents on the reflectingparabolic cylinder mirror 120, is reflected again. It is reflected in adirection in parallel to the advancing direction of the laser beamemitted from the light emitting/detecting element 123 and it then,incidents on the embossed hologram chip 124. When the laser beam, whichhas incidented on the pit of the embossed hologram chip 124, isreflected without being eliminated, the laser beam runs along the sameroute as the incident laser beam in reverse direction and the reflectedlaser beam incident on the light emitting/detecting element 123. As itcan be understood from the above explanation, all of the laser beamsemitted from the light emitting/detecting element 123 incidents on theembossed hologram chip 124 in a direction perpendicular to it.

[Embodiment 7 of the Reading Device]

In the embossed hologram reading device as shown in FIG. 24( b), it isnot possible to read the information on the embossed hologram chip 124on a portion, which is on rear side of the polygonal mirror 122 as seenfrom the direction of the light emitting/detecting element 123. It canbe so designed that necessary information is not written on this portionor that only unnecessary information is written on this portion.However, if an arrangement shown in FIG. 24( c) is adopted, there is noportion, which corresponds to the rear side of the polygonal mirror 122,and all of the information written in the embossed hologram chip 124 canbe read out.

FIG. 24( c) shows the most basic arrangement for this purpose, whichuses a half of the reflecting parabolic cylinder mirror. In FIG. 24( c),the reference numeral 125 represents a reflecting mirror with aparaboloid surface, and it is designed in semi-cylindrical shape havingits length in a direction running perpendicularly crossing the drawingsurface only on the portion where the value of X is negative in FIG. 24(a). The light transmission hole 121 as shown in FIG. 24( b) is notformed because it is not needed. Further, at the focal point of thereflecting half-parabolic cylinder mirror 125, a polygonal mirror 122 isdisposed, which has a rotation axis in parallel to the axis in extendingdirection of the reflecting half-parabolic cylinder mirror 125 and has apolygonal reflecting surface. The reference numeral 126 represents anembossed hologram chip.

After being emitted from the light emitting/detecting element 122 indirection of the polygonal mirror 122, the laser beam is reflected bythe polygonal mirror 122 and incidents on the reflecting half-paraboliccylinder mirror 125. Then, it is reflected and incidents on the embossedhologram chip 126 in a direction perpendicular to it. In this embossedhologram reading device, it is only an end portion of the embossedhologram chip 124, which is on rear side of the polygonal mirror 122when seen from the direction of the light emitting/detecting element123. Accordingly, the portion which cannot be read has little influence.

[Embodiment 8 of the Reading Device]

Further, when the central portion of a reflecting partial paraboloidcylindrical mirror 127 is reduced as shown in FIG. 24( d) and it isconfigured that a portion where the polygonal mirror 122 faces to thereflecting semi-parabolic cylinder mirror 127 is offsetted. There is nomore portion, which cannot be read, and it is possible to read theinformation written in all parts of the embossed hologram chip 128.

[Embodiment 9 of the Reading Device]

When a plurality of reading devices as shown in FIGS. 24( b), (c) and(d) are provided corresponding to a plurality of wavelengths, it ispossible to read a plurality of wavelengths.

[Embodiment 10 of the Reading Device]

Description will be given as below on a reading device, which reads theplane of the authentication verifying chip as an assembly of dots. FIG.25 shows a reading device using a single reading element. FIG. 25( a)shows a general arrangement of the relation between the card and thereading device and FIG. 25( b) is a drawing to explain a data detectingmethod. The reference numeral 11 represents a card body; 13 a card baseplate; 14 an upper surface plate of the card; 15 a verifying chip; 131 areading element; and 130 a container to accommodate the reading element131. The reading element 131 moves in a direction which perpendicularlycrosses the direction that the card is taken into the reading apparatus.

For the movement which perpendicularly crosses the direction that thecard is taken into the device, either of appropriate methods such as apseudo-linear movement based on the rotation on one point as a fulcrum,a linear movement based on the conversion from rotary movement to linearmovement and a linear movement based on a linear motor can be adopted.FIG. 25( b) shows a typical example of a movement route. In thisexample, the reading element moves at the uniform speed in a directionindicated as shown by an arrow mark in FIG. 25( b) and moves along alinear route 135 which is resulted from the movement synthesized withthe moving direction of the card itself. The reading element does notnecessarily move, and it can be used by moving to an arbitrary positionin a direction which perpendicularly crosses the direction of the card11 being taken, and by fixing it there.

[Embodiment 11 of the Reading Device]

While a single reading element is used in the reading device shown inFIG. 25, a plurality of reading elements as shown in FIG. 26 allow thereading by a plurality of routes. As a result, the reliability of thereading can be increased. Because the information to be processed islinear information, this does not increase the load of processing.

FIG. 26( a) shows a general arrangement of the relation between the cardand the reading device and FIG. 26( b) is a drawing to explain adetecting method. The card 11 is the same as the card 11 shown in FIG.25, and detailed description on the card is not given here.

In this Example, in addition to a first reading device which comprisesthe reading element 131 and the container 130 as shown in FIG. 25, asecond reading device is provided which comprises a reading element 132and a container 133.

The second reading device composed of the reading element 132 and thecontainer 133 moves in a direction reverse to the moving direction ofthe first reading device composed of the reading element 131 and thecontainer 130. However, it can be so designed that the moving directionsof the reading devices are the same.

FIG. 26( b) shows a typical example of the moving route. In thisexample, the first reading device and the second reading device move atthe uniform speed in a direction indicated respectively as shown byarrow marks in FIG. 26( b) and move along linear routes 135 and 136which are resulted from the movements synthesized with the movingdirection of the card itself.

[The Reading Route]

A reading error may be caused from an error in the route or from theoperation failure of the reading device. In such the case, reading isperformed by a plurality of reading elements at the same time as shownby the reference numeral 134 in FIG. 27. By finding an average value orby a value determined according to the majority value, the final readinginformation is determined.

[Embodiment 12 of the Reading Device]

Description will be given below on the cases where the reading devicesshown in FIG. 25 to FIG. 28 are applied to the verifying chips shown inFIG. 12 and FIG. 16.

To facilitate the explanation, an example using binary numbers as shownin FIG. 12 is described referring to FIG. 29. This can also be appliedin similar manner to the example using quaternary numbers as shown inFIG. 16.

In FIG. 29, authentication verifying data on a linear detecting routefrom the coordinate (0,0) to the coordinate (31,31) is shown as“11000101001001101010101101110111”. Also, authentication verifying dataon a linear detecting route from the coordinate (0,31) to the coordinate(31,0) is shown as “11100101001010000000110000010011”.

The detecting route is not limited to the routes shown in FIG. 29. Forinstance, an arbitrary route shown in FIG. 28 may be adopted, or theroute can be changed each time when the reading is performed.

Also, converting the coordinate can be made within the apparatus afterthe reading has been performed.

The combination of the data detecting routes as described above mayresult in a substantially large number as 32×32=1024, even under thecondition that it does not turn back as the data detecting route.However, the information of the pattern to be stored in the readingapparatus for comparison is as small as 1024 bits.

Compared with the example of the binary numbers, the example ofquaternary numbers shown in FIG. 16 is merely different in that theamount of information of the pattern for comparison is increased to 2048bits, and then, detailed description is not given here.

[The Reading Route]

FIG. 28 shows several examples of the reading routes. FIGS. 28( a)-(d)each shows an example of using a single data reading route. FIGS. 28(e)-(f) each shows an example of using two data reading routes. Also, itmay be possible to use three or more reading routes.

These reading routes can also be realized by selecting and changing thereading elements of arrays for detection as shown in FIG. 21 and FIG.23. For instance, in the arrays shown in FIG. 21, when the detectingelements are read in the order of D00, D01, D02, D03, . . . D28, D29,D30 and D31, the route 135 as shown in FIG. 25 is obtained. The readingroutes are not limited to these examples, and any arbitrary route can beadopted. Further, it is also possible to electrically read in irregularorder.

Description will be given below on a method for verifying theauthenticity on the verifying chip as shown in FIG. 12 and FIG. 16 byapplying the feature extraction method used in biometrics. Referring toFIG. 30, a method for verifying the authenticity on the verifying chipbased on the binary number data of 0 and 1 shown in FIG. 12 isdescribed. In FIG. 30, when the number “0” continuously appears in fouror more times, the figures of “0” are shown as white-black invertedfigures. Similarly, when the number “1” continuously appears in four ormore times, the figures are shown as enclosed figures.

For instance, there are 13 occurrences of the figures “0000”, startingfrom the coordinates (16,1).

There are 7 occurrences of “00000”, starting from the coordinates(15,5).

There is one occurrence of “000000” at the coordinates (13,31). Thereare 3 occurrences of “0000000”, starting from the coordinates (24,2).There is one occurrence of “000000000000” at the coordinates (6,12).There is one occurrence of “00000000000000” at the coordinates (7,15).

There are 12 occurrences of the figures “1111”, starting from thecoordinates (14,4). There are 8 occurrences of “11111”, starting fromthe coordinates (0,7). There is one occurrence of “111111” at thecoordinates (19,1). There is one occurrence of “1111111” at thecoordinates (12,19). There are 2 occurrences of “11111111”, startingfrom the coordinates (17,6). There is one occurrence of “1111111111” atthe coordinates (14,3).

By detecting each of these features and by detecting coordinates of thestarting positions of these features, the authenticity can be verifiedon the verifying chip.

[Embodiment 13 of the Reading Device]

Referring to FIG. 31, a method for verifying the authenticity on theverifying chip based on quaternary numbers shown in FIG. 16 isdescribed. As shown in FIG. 16, as the features in the matrix, there are5 occurrences of the figures “000”, 3 occurrences of “0000”, 0occurrence of “00000” and 2 occurrences of “000000”, aligned in thetransverse direction.

Also, there are 9 occurrences of “RRR”, four occurrences of “RRRR” and 0occurrence of “RRRRR” aligned in the transverse direction.

Further, there are 5 occurrences of “GGG”, 4 occurrences of “GGGG” and 1occurrence of “GGGGG” aligned in the transverse direction.

Also, there are 8 occurrences of “BBB”, 0 occurrence of “BBBB” and 3occurrences of “BBBBB” aligned in the transverse direction.

By detecting each of these features and by detecting the coordinates ofthe starting positions of these, the authenticity can be verified on theverifying chip. As the feature to be extracted, in addition to the sameverifying data aligned in the transverse direction, the same verifyingdata aligned in the longitudinal direction or the same verifying dataaligned in a hooked form may be used. Further, specific arrangement suchas “ORGB” of different information may be also used.

Also, in case of using the binary data, when adopting intermediate data,e.g., intermediate two gray colors in the white-black binary data, it ispossible to be of quaternary numbers. These arrangements, as describedabove, make carrying out forgery more difficult. Also, when using someof “0” in the binary data for the intermediate color tone as dummies,this will further embarrass those who attempt to forge.

The intermediate color tone can be similarly used in the case where thequaternary data such as 0, R, G and B is used, and this makes itpossible to be of 3-bit octal numbers, 4-bit hexadecimal numbers, etc.

The authentication verifying methods as described above are to digitallyprocess the authentication verifying data recorded digitally. FIG. 32shows an arrangement of analog processing of authentication verifyingdata which has been digitally recorded.

In FIG. 32, the pattern of the verifying chip as shown in FIG. 32( a) isscanned, for instance, along the routes shown by the reference numerals135 and 136 by using the verifying chip reading device as shown in FIG.25 or FIG. 26 and electric signals shown in FIG. 32( b) and FIG. 32( c)are obtained. By comparing these electric signals patterns with thevalid patterns as stored, a unit for identifying the card authenticityis verified and the card itself can be authenticated.

[Embodiment 14 of the Reading Device]

Physical standards for a cash card and a credit card are strictlystipulated from the viewpoint of the practical use. Accordingly,physical standards of the components to be mounted on it are alsostrictly provided. Notwithstanding, it is not entirely deniable thatdeformation may occur due to the excessive use.

To cope with such the problem, it is desirable to arrange a positionalignment mark 48 as shown in FIG. 33 on the verifying chip. In thesimplest case, only one position alignment mark may be used. Preferably,two or more marks are provided to ensure the more reliable positionalignment.

The position alignment mark is useful not only for the reading in thelinear shape but also for the reading in the planar shape using theimage pickup device.

In order to perform the reading more reliably, at the same time with theuse of the position alignment mark, it would be desirable to arrangesome other marks at the position to start the reading and the positionto finish the reading of the unit for identifying the card. Forinstance, a line 49 to start the reading in moving direction and a line50 to finish the reading in moving direction and further, lines 51 and52 to indicate the end portions may be arranged.

The reading of information on the card identifying unit is performed bythe relative movement of the card identifying unit and the readingdevice. To ensure the reliable reading, it is necessary to synchronizethe movements of the card identifying unit and the reading device. If amark 53 for synchronization signal is disposed on the card identifyingunit, the movement of the reading device can be synchronized accordingto the reading of the mark.

Also, the reading start line and the reading finish line and/or the markfor synchronization signal can be used for the normalization of thesignal in the signal processing.

The position alignment mark, the reading start/finish lines and/or themark for synchronization signal are made of fluorescent substanceparticles, and these particles can be prepared by an adequate printingmeans such as an ink jet printer.

[Embodiment 1 of the Processing Flow]

FIG. 34 to FIG. 36 each shows an example of a flow of cardauthentication verifying processing. FIG. 34 shows Embodiment 1 of abasic arrangement.

(1) A card user inserts a cash card into a card slot of a terminaldevice such as an ATM by setting the portion of the card marked with anarrow at the foremost position, the sensor at the card slot senses it,and the card is taken into the device.

(2) When the card is taken into the device, the terminal device readsthe card information from the magnetic recording portion of the card.

(3) The terminal device judges whether the inserted card is a valid cardwhich can be processed by the terminal device or not.

(4) If it is not confirmed that the card can be processed by the devicefrom the card information thus read, or if the information of the cardcannot be read because the card is broken or stained even though it is avalid card, the terminal device judges that it is an illegitimate cardwhich cannot be processed and discharges the card.

(5) The terminal device reads the authentication verifying data from theverifying chip by mechanical scanning using the movement of the cardwhen the card is taken into the device or under the stopped conditionafter the card is taken in.

(6) The terminal device judges whether the card authentication verifyingdata thus read is valid or not.

(7) In a case where the terminal device judges that the cardauthentication verifying data is not valid, it is judged that theinserted card is not a valid card. Then, the card is discharged from theterminal device, and the processing is terminated.

The judgment on the validity of the authentication verifying data andsubsequent processing of the card may be carried out in parallel withthe other processing.

(8) In a case where the terminal device judges that the cardauthentication verifying data is valid, it instructs the user to performfurther input operations, for example, input on the amount to draw.

(9) The user follows the instruction and performs the input operationsuch as the inputting of the amount to be paid.

(10) The host computer judges whether the content of the input operationsuch as the amount to be paid is adequate or not.

(11) If the host computer judges that the content of the input operationis inadequate, for example, the balance short in the deposit, the cardis discharged from the device, and the processing is terminated.

(12) When the host computer judges that the content of the inputoperation such as the amount to be paid is adequate, the outputoperation such as paying of the amount is performed. Then, the card isdischarged from the terminal device and the processing is terminated.

[Embodiment 2 of the Processing Flow]

Referring to FIG. 35, Embodiment 2 of the flow of the cardauthentication verifying process is described.

In the flow of the card authentication verifying process, if the cardauthentication verifying data is not valid, the card is discharged fromthe terminal device in the example as shown in FIG. 34. In theEmbodiment 2, if the authentication verifying data is not valid, thecard is taken into the terminal device, and an alarm is given. In sodoing, it can be easy to dig up the illegitimate card.

(1) When a card user inserts a cash card into a card slot of a terminaldevice such as an ATM by setting the portion of the card marked with anarrow at the foremost position, the sensor at the card slot senses it,and the card is taken into the device.

(2) When the card is taken into the device, the terminal device readsthe card information from the magnetic recording portion of the card.

(3) The terminal device judges whether the inserted card is a valid cardwhich can be processed by the terminal device or not.

(4) If it is not confirmed that the card can be processed by the devicefrom the card information thus read, or if the information of the cardcannot be read because the card is broken or stained even though it is avalid card, the terminal device judges that it is an illegitimate cardwhich cannot be processed and discharges the card.

(5) The terminal device reads the authentication verifying data from theverifying chip by mechanical scanning using the movement of the cardwhen the card is taken into the device or under the stopped conditionafter the card is taken in.

(6) The terminal device judges whether the card authentication verifyingdata thus read is valid or not.

(7) In a case where the terminal device judges that the cardauthentication verifying data is not valid, it is judged that theinserted card is not a valid card. Then, the card is taken into thedevice, and the alarm is given.

It may be possible that the alarm is issued only at a place remote fromthe terminal device, and a message of operation failure is displayed onthe terminal device. This makes it easy to have the user of theillegitimate card under control.

The judgment on the validity of the authentication verifying data andsubsequent processing of the card may be carried out in parallel withthe other processing.

(8) In a case where the terminal device judges that the cardauthentication verifying data is valid, it instructs the user to performfurther input operations, for example, input on the amount to draw.

(9) The user follows the instruction and performs the input operationsuch as the inputting of the amount to be paid.

(10) The host computer judges whether the content of the input operationsuch as the amount to be paid is adequate or not.

(11) If the host computer judges that the content of the input operationis inadequate, for example, the balance short in the deposit, the cardis discharged from the device, and the processing is terminated.

(12) When the host computer judges that the content of the inputoperation such as the amount to be paid is adequate, output operationsuch as paying of the amount is performed. Then, the card is dischargedfrom the terminal device and the processing is terminated.

[Embodiment 3 of the Processing Flow]

Referring to FIG. 36, Embodiment 3 of the flow of the cardauthentication verifying process is described. In the flow of the cardauthentication verifying process, while if the card authenticationverifying data is not valid, the card is quickly taken into the terminaldevice and an alarm is given in the Embodiment 2 as shown in FIG. 35, ifthe authentication verifying data is not valid, the process to use thecard continues in the Embodiment 3. In so doing, it can be easy to digup the use of the illegitimate card.

(1) A card user inserts a cash card into a card slot of a terminaldevice such as an ATM by setting the portion of the card marked with anarrow at the foremost position. Then, the sensor at the card slot sensesit, and the card is taken into the device.

(2) When the card is taken into the device, the terminal device readsthe card information from the magnetic recording portion of the card.

(3) The terminal device judges whether the inserted card is a valid cardwhich can be processed by the terminal device or not.

(4) If it is not confirmed that the card can be processed by the devicefrom the card information thus read, or if the information of the cardcannot be read because the card is broken or stained even though it is avalid card, the terminal device judges that it is an illegitimate cardwhich cannot be processed and discharges the card.

(5) The terminal device reads the authentication verifying data from theverifying chip by mechanical scanning using the movement of the cardwhen the card is taken into the device or under the stopped conditionafter the card is taken in.

(6) The terminal device judges whether the card authentication verifyingdata thus read is valid or not.

(7) In a case where the terminal device judges that the cardauthentication verifying data is not valid, it instructs the user toperform further input operations, for example, input on the amount todraw.

The judgment on the validity of the authentication verifying data andsubsequent processing of the card may be carried out in parallel withthe other processing.

(8) The user follows the instruction and performs the input operationsuch as the inputting of the amount to be paid.

(9) Then, the card is taken into the terminal device, and an alarm isgiven.

It may be arranged that the alarm is issued only at a place remote fromthe terminal device, and a message of operation failure is displayed onthe terminal device. This makes it easy to have the user of theillegitimate card under control.

(10) In a case where the terminal device judges that card authenticationverifying data is valid, it instructs the user to perform further inputoperations such as the input of the amount to draw.

(11) The user follows the instruction and performs the input operationsuch as the input of the amount to be paid.

(12) The host computer judges whether the content of the input operationsuch as the amount to be paid is adequate or not.

(14) If the host computer judges that the content of the input operationis inadequate, for example, the balance short in the deposit, the cardis discharged from the device, and the processing is terminated.

With the arrangement as described above, the time, during which the userwho uses the illegitimate card uses the terminal device, can beextended. This means not only that gives longer time for capturing thecard user, but also that makes it possible to obtain further evidencesuch as the user's fingerprints by the input operation. If acontact-type touch switch is adopted, this makes the taking offingerprints much easier.

Physical standards for a cash card and a credit card are strictlystipulated from the viewpoint of the practical use. Accordingly,physical standards of the components to be mounted on it are alsostrictly provided. However, it is not entirely deniable that deformationmay occur due to the excessive use.

INDUSTRIAL APPLICABILITY

The card authentication verifying chip and the card with the cardauthentication verifying chip as described above can be adopted in theapplications such as bank cash cards, credit cards, prepaid cards,membership cards, securities, ID cards, admission allowance and othertypes of certificate.

A chip made of a natural material or an artificial material in which theinterference of incident light and reflected light causes an opticalpattern, similarly to a case of the embossed hologram chip, and which isnacreous or iridescent may be adopted in place of the embossed hologramchip.

1. A card comprising a base plate and an authentication verifying chip,wherein said verifying chip is layered on said base plate, and anembossed hologram having pits with depth of ¹/4 wavelength of incidentlights of a plurality of wavelengths and a portion without the pit isdisposed on said verifying chip.
 2. The card according to claim 1,wherein said embossed hologram is composed of pits with different depthsdisposed perpendicularly to said chip.
 3. The card according to claim 1,wherein said embossed hologram is composed of pits with different depthsdisposed inclined on said chip.
 4. The card according to claim 1,wherein said pits are arranged at regular intervals.
 5. The cardaccording to claim 4, wherein said pits are arranged based on binarytrue random numbers.
 6. The card according to claim 5, wherein said pitsare a part of the pits arranged based on binary true random numbers. 7.The card according to claim 4, wherein said pits are arranged based onquaternary true random numbers.
 8. The card according to claim 7,wherein said pits are a part of the pits arranged based on quaternarytrue random numbers.
 9. The card according to claim 1, wherein a markfor reading position alignment is further provided on said verifyingchip.
 10. The card according to claim 9, wherein said mark for readingposition alignment provided is one mark.
 11. The card according to claim9, wherein said mark for reading position alignment provided is onemark.
 12. The card according to claim 9, wherein a line to start thereading, a line to finish the reading and a line to indicate the endportion are provided.
 13. The card according to claim 9, 10, 11 or 12,wherein a mark for synchronization signal is further provided.
 14. Anembossed hologram chip reading device for reading an embossed hologramcomposed of pits with depth of ¼ wavelength of incident lights of aplurality of wavelengths and a portion without the pit on anauthentication verifying chip mounted on a card, wherein said readingdevice having a plurality of light sources of a plurality of wavelengthsfor irradiating said authentication verifying chip and an image pickupdevice for photographing a plurality of images of a plurality ofwavelengths of said authentication verifying chip thus irradiated. 15.An embossed hologram chip reading device for reading an embossedhologram composed of pits with depth of ¼ wavelength of incident lightsof a plurality of wavelengths and a portion without the pit on anauthentication verifying chip mounted on a card, wherein said readingdevice having a light emitting/detecting elements matrix for theincident lights of the plurality of the wavelengths with the same areaas said verifying chip.
 16. An embossed hologram chip reading device forreading an embossed hologram composed of pits with depth of ¼ wavelengthof incident lights of a plurality of wavelengths and a portion withoutthe pit on an authentication verifying chip mounted on a card, whereinsaid reading device having at least one light emitting/detectingelements array for the incident lights of the plurality of thewavelengths with the same width as said verifying chip.
 17. An embossedhologram chip reading device for reading an embossed hologram composedof pits with depth of ¼ wavelength of incident lights of a plurality ofwavelengths and a portion without the pit on an authentication verifyingchip mounted on a card, wherein said embossed hologram chip readingdevice having a set of light emitting/detecting elements, for theincident lights of the plurality of the wavelengths, movable indirection of the width of said verifying chip and said incident lightemitting/detecting element reads the embossed hologram of the verifyingchip in moving.
 18. The embossed hologram chip reading device accordingto claim 17, wherein said reading device has more than one set of lightemitting/detecting elements for the incident lights of the plurality ofthe wavelengths.
 19. The card according to claim 1, wherein said pitsare arranged with an adequate distance to each other.